BENTATA Pierre

Aix Marseille Université

LID2MS

Parcours antérieur :

  • Thèse à Aix Marseille Université,
  • Post-doctorat de deux ans au CRED (Paris II Panthéon Assas) – travail sur la création d’un indicateur de sécurité juridique, sous la direction de Bruno Deffains,
  • Assistant professeur à l’école supérieure de commerce de Troyes (SCBS), jusqu’à mon retour à Aix Marseille Université.

Thématiques de recherche actuelles et/ou futures en économie du droit :

  • Jusqu’à présent, étude des décisions des cours de justice françaises dans les cas d’accidents environnementaux et de pollution – approche statistique des décisions des juges pour comprendre les interactions entre réglementation et responsabilité civile dans le droit français. 
  • Depuis un an, travail sur la réglementation des plateformes numériques – analyse des propositions de réglementations européennes pour prévoir leur efficacité et leurs potentiels effets pervers.

Projets de recherche dans le cadre de ce recrutement :

Deux projets en rapport avec l’économie numérique :

  • Développement d’indicateurs pour être en mesure de définir le périmètre des marchés sur lesquels opèrent les plateformes et d’en déduire l’état de la concurrence sur ces marchés,
  • Recherches de solutions à la protection des données personnelles pour les utilisateurs de services fournis par les plateformes. 

Enseignements en économie du droit :

  • Cours de L3 d’Économie Publique où sont utilisés de nombreux travaux de l’analyse économique du droit (analyse de la propriété, de la responsabilité, problèmes de coordination, risque de capture des régulateurs), 
  • Cours intitulé “Economic analysis of data & privacy” dans le M2 European Master in Law & Economics,
  • À partir de l’année prochaine, “Introduction à l’analyse économique du droit” en L2.

Quelques publications dans le domaine (titre + abstract) :

  • “Correction Activities by French Supreme Courts and Control over their Dockets”, avec R. ESPINOSA et Y. HIRIART, Revue d’Economie Politique, 129(2): 169-204, 2019.

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to observe how supreme courts use their discretionary power over their dockets to correct appellate courts’ decisions relative to their own interpretation of the law. There are two supreme courts in France, the Conseil d’État for the administrative branch, and the Cour de Cassation for the civil one. In both courts, at different dates though, a reform took place that gave them discretionary control over their dockets. Hence, a difference in the supreme courts’ decisions might be due to either different correction activities, selection strategies, or both. Accordingly, it is necessary to distinguish between them before drawing any conclusions about supreme courts’ behaviors. We develop an econometric approach to assess whether the correction activities are similar between supreme courts, and whether these activities are affected when the supreme courts can select cases. Using an original database of all environmental cases determined by the supreme courts between 1956 and 2010, we rely on a counterfactual approach to compare cases across the courts before and after the reforms. Our study concludes that correction activities do not differ across the courts as long as they are submitted to the same selection rule. We also find that the supreme courts use the possibility of selection to increase their pro-plaintiff correction activities in a way that affects the overall probability of success of plaintiffs and defendants.

  • “Liability as a Complement to Environmental Regulation: An Empirical Study of the French Legal System”, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 16(3): 201-228, 2014.

Abstract: Reasons for the joint use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability to cope with environmental accidents have been a longstanding issue in law and economics literature. This article, which includes the first empirical study of the French environmental legal system, analyzes courts’ decisions when injurers complied with regulatory standards. The results provide some evidence that liability may be a complement to regulation by encouraging aspects of care that cannot be regulated at reasonable costs, especially human behaviour and organization within dangerous entities. An unexpected effect of liability is observed: judges are more severe with the most regulated firms and public agents compared to smaller, private actors. This might be interpreted as complementing regulation when enforcement of regulatory standards is thought to be weak.

  • “Environmental Regulation and Civil Liability under Causal Uncertainty: An Empirical Study of the French Legal System”, Review of Law & Economics 9(2): 239-263, 2013.

Abstract: the key question in this article is to determine whether regulation and regulator information can help to solve causal uncertainty problems in liability. A widely held view among Law and Economics scholars is that civil liability alone is not well-suited to cope with environmental accidents, especially where causation is uncertain or costly to establish. Instead of a simple civil liability rule, it is therefore advocated that a regulatory system be implemented combined with a public insurance scheme, or, alternatively, to institute a mix of regulation and civil liability. Such a mix of regulation and civil liability prevails in French law, and this article presents an original analysis of French court decisions concerning cases of environmental accidents for which causation was uncertain and in which regulators were not able to control for levels of organizational and human care. The dataset covers more than 50 years of trial outcomes from the highest civil and criminal court in France – Cour de Cassation. Our results seem to provide evidence that regulation provides a new way to address causal uncertainty at the liability stage. This may be due to a transfer of information from regulators to judges and to the adoption by judges of a probabilistic approach to causation.

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